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FOURTH AMENDMENT-ILLEGAL SEARCHES AND THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
In its past term, the Supreme Court proposed a
new standard of admissibility for live witness evi-
dence obtained as the result of an illegal search.
The Court in United States v. Ceccolinil refused to
adopt a per se rule-that the testimony of a live
witness should never be excluded at trial, no matter
how close and proximate the connection between
it and a violation of the fourth amend-
ment2--because "verbal evidence which derives so
immediately from unlawful entry... is no less the
'fruit' of official illegality than the more common-
place tangible fruits of the unwarranted intru-
sion."3 However, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority,4 concluded that "the exclusionary rule
should be invoked with much greater reluctance
where the claim is based on a causal relationship
between a constitutional violation and the discov-
ery of a live witness than when a similar claim is
advanced to support suppression of an inanimate
object." 5 While it is clear that the Court did not
intend to adopt a per se rule, the Ceccolini decision
does not clearly indicate how the Court expects the
exclusionary rule to operate against live witness
testimony obtained as the result of an illegal search.
I
In December 1974, Ronald Biro, a uniformed
police officer on assignment to patrol school cross-
ings, went into the Sleepy Hollow Flower Shop in
North Tarrytown, New York, to enjoy a cigarette
break with his friend Lois Hennessey, an employee
'435 U.S. 268 (1978).
'U.S. CONsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
3 435 U.S. at 275 (citing Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963)).4 justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Justices
Powell, Stevens, Stewart, and White. ChiefJustice Burger
concurred in the judgment, and Justice Marshall, joined
by Justice Brennan, dissented. Justice Blackmun took no
part in the decision.
5 435 U.S. at 280.
in the shop. Officer Biro picked up an envelope
lying on the drawer of the cash register and discov-
ered that it contained gambling policy slips and
cash. Without telling Hennessey what he had seen,
Biro asked her to whom the envelope belonged.
She replied that it belonged to Ralph Ceccolini.
The following day Biro mentioned his discovery
to some North Tarrytown detectives who reported
the information to Lance Emory, an FBI agent
who until December 1973 had conducted a sur-
veillance of the flower shop, which was believed to
be involved in illegal gambling operations. Four
months after the Biro search, Emory interviewed
Hennessey in her home. Emory did not specifically
refer to the incident involving Officer Biro. Hen-
nessey indicated her willingness to aid the govern-
ment and related the events which occurred during
her visit with Officer Biro.
In May 1975 Ceccolini testified before a federal
grand jury that he had never taken policy bets.
Hennessey refuted this testimony, and the grand
jury indicted Ceccolini for perjury. He waived a
jury trial and, with the consent of all the parties,
the district court considered Ceccolini's motion to
suppress Hennessey's testimony as the fruit of an
illegal search6 simultaneously with the trial on the
merits. The court 'returned a verdict of guilty,
which was immediately set aside7 on the grounds
that without Hennessey's testimony, which the
court found to be the inadmissible fruit of an illegal
search, there was insufficient proof of Ceccolini's
guilt.,
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
6 The government conceded in oral argument that
officer Biro's search was illegal. United States v. Ceccol.
ini, 542 F.2d 136, 140 n.5 (2d Cir. 1976).
7 Since the judge ruled in favor of the defendant's
motion to suppress after a verdict of guilty had been
entered, a reversal of the ruling would require no further
proceeding in the district court, but merely a reinstate-
ment of the finding of guilt. 435 U.S. at 290-91. Such a
procedure has been held not to violate the fifth amend-
ment right not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the
same offense since the Double Jeopardy Clause in such
an instance only prohibits the government from reprose-
cuting its case against the accused. United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975).$The district court decision. is unreported.
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decision.9 The court held that Hennessey's testi-
mony was inadmissible, rejecting the government's
arguments that it would have inevitably discovered
Hennessey in the course of the investigation apart
from the illegal search,10 that the testimony of
Hennessey was an act of free will sufficient to purge
the taint of illegality, and that illegally obtained
evidence should not be excluded from a trial for a
crime that occurred after the illegal search." The
dissent argued that the Hennessey testimony
should be admissible, having accepted the govern-
ment's second proposition that the act of free will
sufficiently purged the taint of illegality. 12
The Supreme Court reversed and held that there
was a sufficient .degree of attenuation between
Biro's search and Hennessey's testimony at trial to




Since Weeks v. United States,14 the Court has in-
terpreted the fourth amendment to require that
evidence obtained as the fruit of an illegal search
not be used at trial.' 5 The exclusionary rule also.
precludes the use of evidence which was deriva-
tively obtained as the result of the illegal search 6
unless the connection between the evidence and
9 542 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1976). The decision was by a
vote of two to one.
"There is judicial support for the proposition that
illegally obtained evidence which would have inevitably
been discovered in the normal course of a legal investi-
gation is admissible. See United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d
33, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1973). But the constitutionality of this
"inevitable discovery" rule has never been passed upon
by the Supreme. Court. See Fitzpatrick v. New York, 414
U.S. 1050 (1973) (White, J., joined by Douglas, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari).
" 542 F.2d at 141-43.
12Id. at 143 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
"a 435 U.S. at 279. The government did not seek review
of the court of appeal's decision that the investigation
would not have inevitably lead to the discovery of Hen-
nessey, and the Court did not reach the government's
contention that the exclusionary rule should not be ap-
plied when the evidence derived from the search is being
used to prove a subsequent crime. Id. at 273.
4 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
"s "If letters and private documents can thus be
seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution."
Id. at 393.
'6 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920), in which the Court held that copies
of papers and documents illegally seized from the accused
could not be admitted in evidence.
the illegality is "so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint."' 7
According to Supreme Court opinions, the basic
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful
police conduct. "The rule is calculated to prevent,
not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel
respect for the constitutional guarantee in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incen-
tive to disregard it.' !8 The Court has assumed that
the exclusionary rule does have the desired deter-
rent effect,' 9 and therefore, its use is thought to be
worth the societal costs it engenders. These costs
include deflecting the truth-finding process and
freeing the guilty, 2 thereby depriving society of its
remedy against lawbreakers, 2 as well as punishing
17 308 U.S. at 341. This attenuation analysis standard
was first proposed in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338 (1939), and has since been adopted as the authoritive
test for determining whether evidence derivatively ob-
tained as the result of an illegal search is admissible. See
also 471, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. (1963)
488.
In Nardone the Court held that § 605 of the Commu-
nications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605, which prohibits the
publication of illegally monitored communications, also
prohibits its derivative use unless the "connection [be-
tween the illegality and the evidence] has become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint." 308 U.S. at 341.
In Wong Sun the Court employed this attenuation
analysis in reaching its decision that the voluntary state-
ment made by Wong Sun several days after the fourth
amendment violation was admissible evidence. 371 U.S.
at 490. See note 37 and accompanying text infra.
" Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). In
Elkins the Court held that evidence obtained by state
officers in a search which violated the accused's fpurth
amendment rights is inadmissible in a federal criminal
trial, even when there was no participation by federal
officers.
is See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449-54
(1976), in which the Court concluded that there was no
evidence that the exclusionary rule did have a deterrent
effect.
Empirical statistics are not available to show that
the inhabitants of states which follow the exclusion-
ary rule suffer less from lawless searches and seizures
than those states which admit evidence unlawfully
obtained. Since as a practical matter it is never easy
to prove a negative, it is hardly likely that conclusive
factual data could ever be assembled. For much the
same reason, it cannot positively be demonstrated
that enforcement of the criminal law is either more
or less effective under either rule.
Id. at 453 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 205,
218 (1960)).
" Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976).
21 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954), in the
Court in a five-to-four decision refused to impose the
exclusionary rule to prevent evidence unlawfully ob-
tained by state police officers from being admitted in a
state trial. This decision was overruled in Mapp v. Ohio,
[Vol. 69
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police for good faith law enforcement efforts.'
Recognizing both the assumed deterrent benefit
and the societal costs of the rule, the Court has
restricted its application to those areas in which its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served.23
III
In reaching its decision in Ceccolini, the Court
considered both whether the taint of illegality had
been sufficiently dissipatede and whether the ap-
plication of the rule to live witness testimony would
advance its basic deterrent purposes.2 5 However, it
is not always clear throughout the Court's discus-
sion which of these two factors was considered
predominant.
The Ceccolini Court reached three distinct deci-
sions. First, the Court held that in this case, the
degree of attenuation between the search and Hen-
nessey's testimony at trial was sufficient to dissipate
the taint of illegality.2 6 Second, it concluded that
in this case the exclusionary rule would have no
deterrent effect.27 And, third, the Court decided
that, in general, live witness testimony which is the
fruit of an illegal search should be excluded with
"greater reluctance" than is illegally obtained
physical evidence.
28
In reaching these decisions, Justice Rehnquist
based his majority decision on two factors. First,
he declared that the degree of free will exercised
by the witness in deciding to testify is a relevant
factor in determining whether his testimony should
367 U.S. 643 (1961), in which the Court held that the
fourteenth amendment fully incorporated the fourth
amendment and that the exclusionary rule was an essen-
tial element of that amendment. The rule was thus
applicable in state as well as federal trials.
a See Oaks, Studying the Excusionasy Ruk in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. Ray. 665, 736-57 (1970).
' See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974), in which the Court refused to extend the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule to grand jury use of
illegally obtained evidence; Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954), in which the Court refused to exclude
illegally-obtained evidence used to impeach the credibil-
ity of the accused's testimony at trial.
"The constitutional question under the Fourth
Amendment [is] ... whether "the connection between
the lawless conduct and the discovery of the challenged
evidence has become 'so attenuated as to dissipate the




be admissible.29 He reasoned that "[t]he greater the
willingness of the witness to testify freely the greater
the likelihood that he or she will be discovered by
legal means, and concomitantly, the smaller the
incentive to conduct an illegal search to discover
the witness."' s Furthermore, the time, place, and
manner of the initial questioning of the witness
may be so removed from the illegality which led to
the discovery of the witness that said illegality will
not affect the witness's willingness to testify.31
The second factor coneerning admissibility dis-
cussed by the majority was that exclusion of the
live witness testimony would result in perpetually
prohibiting that witness from testifying about rel-
evant and material facts unrelated to the purpose
of the illegal search.i2 justice Rehnquist concluded
that the cost ofexcluding this live witness testimony
is greater than the cost of excluding similarly ob-
tained physical evidence. Therefore, "a more direct
link" between the illegality and the testimony is
required in order to make the testimony inadmis-
sible.3
The Court's initial determination that "[t]he
greater the willingness of the witness to testify...
the smaller the incentive to conduct an illegal
search to discover the witness" 34 presupposes that
the police can know prior to the discovery of a
witness that he will freely testify. But, as the dissent
in Ceccolini pointed out, "This reasoning surely
reverses the normal sequence of events; the in-
stances must be very few in which a witness' will-
ingness to testify is known before he or she is
discovered."' 5 Additionally, it is not clear what this
consideration adds to the determination of whether
the accused's fourth amendment rights have been
violated-the relevant question in determining
whether the exclusionary rule should be invoked.
If the witness was discovered without an illegal
search, the exclusionary rule clearly is not appli-
29 It is interesting to note that in presenting this factor,
Justice Rehnquist shifted his focus from attenuation anal-
ysis to the consideration of the deterrent purposes of the
rule. As he wrote, "[Wle are first impelled to conclude
that the degree of free will exercised by the witness is.not
irrelevant in determining the extent to which the basic
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule will be ad-
vanced by its application." Id at 276.
3D Id
31 Id In presenting this factor, Justice Rehnquist
shifted the focus back to the determination of whether
the taint resulting from the illegality has been sufficiently
attenuated to permit the admission of the evidence.
27 d at 277.2sId
3'Id at 276.
' 435 U.S. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19781
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
cable. But if the witness was discovered as the
result of a fourth amendment violation, speculation
that he might have come forward without the
illegal search does not address the issue whether
the connection between this witness and an illegal-
ity is such as to require the exclusion of his testi-
mony.
Justice Rehnquist's observation that the time,
place and manner of the initial questioning of the
witness may be sufficiently removed from the ille-
gality to dissipate any taint, is on point concerning
attenuation analysis. In Wong Sun v. United States,s
6
the Court held that although the arrest of an
individual and the search of his apartment for
narcotics violated his fourth amendment rights, the
statement which he made voluntarily several days
later after he had been released on his own recog-
nizance was sufficiently unconnected with the il-
legality as to dissipate any taint.37 Similarly, the
Ceceolini Court appeared to have been relying on
this type of analysis in holding that the illegal
search of Ceccolini's store and the statement Hen-
nessey made voluntarily four months later were
sufficiently unconnected to rid the Hennessey tes-
timony of any illegal taint. In going beyond this
determination to reach its other two decisions, the
Court indicated its desire to examine further the
value of the exclusionary rule.
In its concern over the perpetual exclusion of the
witness's testimony, the second factor considered
by Justice Rehnquist, the majority opinion failed
to make clear that it is the witness, not the testi-
mony, which is the evidence obtained as the result
of the illegal search. Since the exclusionary rule
prohibits the admission of illegally obtained evi-
dence, it follows that if knowledge of the witness
was illegally obtained, that witness can not testify
at trial. Furthermore, in concluding that the cost
of excluding live witness testimony is so great that
the decision to apply the exclusionary rule in live
witness cases should be made with "greater reluc-
tance" than in similar physical evidence cases, the
Court ignored the fact that the cost of excluding
testimony may be no greater than the cost of
excluding any probative physical evidence which
may have no connection with the original purpose
of the illegal search, but was obtained as a result
s 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
37 Id at 490.
3 As the dissent pointed out, "While it is true that
'often' the exclusion of testimony will be very costly to
society, at least as often the exclusion of physical evidence
.. will be costly to the same societal interests." 435 U.S.
at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
thereof'ss The Court noted that live witness testi-
mony may not be as "reliable or dependable" as
inanimate evidencess If the excluded physical ev-
idence is more "reliable or dependable," it seems
that the cost of excluding it is just as great, if not
greater, than that of excluding its less probative
live witness counterpart. If the societal costs are
equal, the rule governing admissibility should be
the same.
Both the concurrence and the dissent' rejected
the majority's amorphous "greater reluctance"
standard. Arguing that the fourth amendment pre-
cludes the use of any illegally obtained evidence,4'
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, rejected any stan-
dard which would apply the exclusionary rule
differently to live witness evidence than to physical
evidence. He considered the issue of attenuation to
be the relevant question and concluded that Hen-
nessey's testimony was not removed sufficiently
from the search to purge it of its illegal taint. 2
While Chief Justice Burger, who concurred in
the judgment, also rejected the majority's "greater
reluctance" standard, he did so because he con-
cluded that live witness testimony should always
be admissible.4 His concurrence in Ceccolini is con-
sistent with other recent opinions written by the
Chief Justice in which he criticized the expansive
use of the exclusionary rule." In Ceccolini, Burger
concluded that the high societal cost of losing the
testimony of an eye-witness who would appear
under oath outweighed its unlikely deterrent bene-
fit.
4 5
Recent Supreme Court cases concerning the ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule have evidenced
a trend toward reexamining its application in light
of its societal costs. In companion cases during the
1976 term," the Court refused to exclude evidence
39 "This is not to say, of course, that live-witness testi-
mony is always or even usually more reliable or depend-
able than inanimate evidence. Indeed, just the opposite
may be true." Id. at 278.
0 Id. at 280 (Burger, C. J., concurring); id. at 286
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
" "I do not believe that the same tree, having its roots
in an unconstitutional search or seizure, can bear two
different kinds of fruit, with one kind less susceptible than
the other to exclusion on Fourth Amendment grounds."
Id. at 286 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id at 280 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
"See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976)
(Burger, C. J., concurring); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed-
eral Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C. J.,
dissenting).
45 435 U.S. at 285 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
'4 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. (1976) 433; Stone v.
Powell, 438 U.S. 465 (1976).
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obtained in good faith through a search pursuant
to an invalid search warrant47 and refused to ex-
tend federal habeas corpus review to exclusionary
rule claims if the state had provided a "full and
fair litigation" of the issue in its courts." In reach-
ing these decisions, the Court determined that the
contribution of the exclusionary rule to the effec-
tuation of the fourth amendment goals was out-
weighed by the substantial societal costs.' 9
In Ceccolini, the Court reached the same result,
concluding that "[t]he cost of permanently silenc-
ing Hennessey is too great for an even-handed
system of law enforcement to bear in order to
secure such a speculative and very likely negligible
deterrent effect. ' ' 0 But the Court not only con-
cluded that the exclusion of the Hennessey testi-
mony would have no deterrent effect, it also con-
cluded that the testimony was not fruit tainted by
the illegal search. The former conclusion assumes
that the exclusionary rule would ordinarily apply
but should not in this case because the rule's
purpose would not be furthered, whereas the latter
conclusion assumes that the rule does not apply to
this particular fact situation at all. Clearly, the
Court can not mean both.
The Court may be positing a general rule that
when the deterrent effect of excluding evidence is
outweighed by the societal costs that exclusion
imposes, the evidence should be admitted. If so,
the Ceccolini Court did not break new ground with
its decision for in United States v. Janis,5" the Court
postulated this same rule. In that case, the Court
had explicitly stated that, "[i]f... the exclusionary
rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then,
clearly, its use ... is unwarranted.""' Since the
discussion of the Ceccolini Court focused on a con-
47 In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the
search in question had been conducted pursuant to a
search warrant, but three weeks after the warrant's issu-
ance, the Court in United States v. Spinelli, 393 U.S. 41G
(1969), held that this type of warrant was constitutionally
insufficient.
48 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 494.
49 Id. at 495.
wo 435 U.S. at 280.
5'428 U.S. 433.
52 428 U.S. at 454. See also Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244 (1969). There the Court refused to apply the
exclusionary rule to evidence obtained through wiretap-
ping since the seizure was conducted before the Court
ruled such wiretappings unconstitutional in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). "We simply decline
to extend the court-made exclusionary rule to cases in
which its deterrent purpose would not be served." 394
U.S. at 254 n.24.
sideration of the deterrent purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule and on weighing its costs and benefits,
the Court could have reaffirmed Janis and ended
its inquiry in this case with its conclusion that
silencing Hennessey would have a negligible deter-
rent effect.ss But the Ceccolini court did not end its
inquiry at that point. It went beyond Janis and
concluded that the exclusionary rule should be
invoked with "greater reluctance" in the case of
illegally obtained live witn ess evidence than in
cases of illegally-obtained tangible evidence. How
this arguably unnecessary and nebulous standard
will be applied by courts in future cases is an open
question.
CONCLUSION
There appears to be a trend in recent exclusion-
ary rule decisions to reevaluate the use of the rule
in cases in which its deterrent effects are out-
weighed by its societal costs. United States v. Ceccolini
follows that trend. But in the narrower area of the
exclusionary rules' application to illegally discov-
ered live witness evidence, the Court's conclusion
that the rule should be invoked with "greater
reluctance" than in the case of illegally obtained
physical evidence is one without precedent. The
majority specifically said that it was rejecting a per
se rule that live witness evidence should always be
admissible, but it provided no standards for deter-
mining when, if eVer, the exclusionary rule could
be applied to live witness testimony in a situation
in which the societal costs did not outweigh its
deterrent benefits. In fact, Chief Justice Burger in
concurrence noted that he could not imagine such
a situation.5' Perhaps none exists. If not, since the
Court has concluded that the exclusionary rule
should only be invoked where there is a deterrent
benefit greater than the societal costs,5 perhaps the
Court should have adopted the per se rule of
admissibility proposed by the government and ac-
cepted by the concurrence. As it stands, all United
States v. Ceccolini indicates is that the Court has
rejected a per se rule and adopted something else.
What that something else is remains unclear.
435 U.S.' at 280.
5' "I would not prevent a fact finder from hearing and
considering the relevant statements of any witness, except
perhaps under the most remarkable circum-
stances-although none such have ever been postulated
that would lead me to exclude the testimony of a live
witness." Id at 280 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
5 ' See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
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